Designing Catastrophe Bonds to Securitize Systemic Risks in Agriculture: The Case of Georgia Cotton

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · Volume 31, Issue 2, August 2006 · Pages 318–338

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Abstract

This article makes an initial attempt to design catastrophe (CAT) bond products for agriculture and examines the potential of these instruments as mechanisms for transferring agricultural risks from insurance companies to investors/speculators in the global capital market. The case of Georgia cotton is considered as a specific example. The CAT bond contracts are based on percentage deviations of realized state average yields relative to the long-run average. The contracts are priced using historical state-level cotton yield data. The principal finding of the study is that the proposed CAT bonds demonstrate potential as risk transfer mechanisms for crop insurance companies.

Article details

Issue
Volume 31, Issue 2
Published
August 2006
Pages
318–338
Full text
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