Some Simulation Results for a Green Insurance Mechanism

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · Volume 30, Issue 1, April 2005 · Pages 94–108

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Abstract

This analysis extends previous work on green insurance by proposing a mechanism that offers a stronger adoption incentive and is applicable to heterogeneous populations and non-binary adoption decisions. Endogenous learning about the new technology is incorporated, and empirically calibrated simulation results are presented for the case of reduced-phosphorus dairy diets. Results show that the mechanism has a significant impact on behavior and may incur no net cost for the regulator when an insurance premium is charged. Conditions under which a green payment mechanism may be preferable to green insurance also are discussed.

Article details

Issue
Volume 30, Issue 1
Published
April 2005
Pages
94–108
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