Baker, Timothy G.

December, 2000

By: Preckel, Paul V.; Shively, Gerald E.; Baker, Timothy G.; Chu, Mei-Chin; Burrell, Jessica Eide
This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.

July, 1992

By: Turvey, Calum G.; Baker, Timothy G.; Weersink, Alfons
This article examines farm operating risks and cash-rent determination through the use of the efficient set mathematics. The efficient set mathematics proves to be a pragmatic approach to characterizing operating risks, and the relationships between operating risks and cash-rent determination. Various separation theorems are used to postulate the relationship between operating risk and cash rents. Preliminary evidence appears to support the theoretical conclusion that opperating risk and cash-rent determination are related.