Gohin, Alexandre

By: Osseni, Abdel Fawaz ; Gohin, Alexandre ; Rault, Arnaud
Infectious animal diseases raise serious challenges for both public health and the livestock sector. We develop an original principalÐmultiple agent model for preventing these diseases that explicitly considers the heterogeneity of risk-averse farmers in addition to production externalities and ex ante informational asymmetries. Our results confirm that failing to consider farmersÕ heterogeneity generates Pareto-inefficient solutions. When using individual-based instruments, the government should cope with heterogeneity by increasing guaranteed payments and reducing average payments. However, when population-based instruments are the only available policy tools, increasing average payments is better for reducing moral hazard issues.
By: Gohin, Alexandre; Treguer, David
Ethanol production has recently surged in response to biofuel policies and increased fossil oil prices. We develop a partial equilibrium model focused on U.S. corn-based ethanol production with downside risk-averse farmers to assess the consequences of ethanol production on agricultural volatility. We report substantial effects on the distribution of corn prices with increases in the variance of prices received by farmers. Risk-averse corn farmers still benefit due to the higher mean price effect. From a methodological perspective, this analysis reveals that downside risk aversion may be important.