COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON IMPORT TENDERS: THE CASE OF MINOR OILSEEDS

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics · Volume 26, Issue 1, July 2001 · Pages 142–157

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Abstract

A common and noteworthy application of auctions and bidding is that of tendering for imports, used for both price determination and the allocation of purchases among sellers. In this study we develop a model to evaluate bidding strategies and competition and apply it to Egyptian oilseeds imports. Generally, bids could be explained with a relatively high degree of confidence using accessible data. In addition, there appear to be groups of bidders characterized by differences in their bid functions. These statistical results were used to determine optimal bids and evaluate the effects of several critical variables. The results are particularly interesting for understanding sellers’ bidding strategies and competition among rivals, as well as impacts of specific variables on optimal bids and payoffs to sellers.

Article details

Issue
Volume 26, Issue 1
Published
July 2001
Pages
142–157
Full text
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