Baerenklau, Kenneth A.

By: Knapp, Keith C.; Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
An economic model of ground water salinization is developed. Starting from a full, high-quality aquifer, there is an initial extraction period, an intermediate waste disposal period, and a final drainage period. Drainage management is initially source control and reuse, but eventually culminates in evaporation basins and a system steady-state. This process occurs over long time scales but is consistent with historical observation. Efficiency is qualitatively similar to common property though quantitative magnitudes differ substantially. Regulatory pricing instruments are developed to support the efficient allocation. The system is not sustainable in that net returns generally decline through time until the steady-state.
By: Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
This analysis extends previous work on green insurance by proposing a mechanism that offers a stronger adoption incentive and is applicable to heterogeneous populations and non-binary adoption decisions. Endogenous learning about the new technology is incorporated, and empirically calibrated simulation results are presented for the case of reduced-phosphorus dairy diets. Results show that the mechanism has a significant impact on behavior and may incur no net cost for the regulator when an insurance premium is charged. Conditions under which a green payment mechanism may be preferable to green insurance also are discussed.
By: Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.